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I. INTRODUCTION
Several distributed cryptocurrencies systems have emerged,
and among them, Bitcoin [1] is often designated as the pioneer
this kind of systems. As such, Bitcoin shows some vulnerabil-
ities in presence of malicious entities, and some recent works
have proposed to improve upon Bitcoin weaknesses. This brief
abstract is devoted to the analysis of one of these recent works,
and shows through an analytical performance evaluation that
new Bitcoin improvements are still needed.
II. THE BITCOIN NETWORK
The Bitcoin network [1] is a peer-to-peer payment network
that relies on distributed algorithms and cryptographic tools
to allow entities to anonymously buy items or services with
bitcoins (i.e., Bitcoin currencies). The main ingredients of
this network are transactions issued by buyers each time they
wish to spend bitcoins and the blockchain, a public transaction
ledger which eventually contains an ordered sequence of all
the issued transactions (more precisely, an ordered sequence
of transactions blocks, each one being a set of issued trans-
actions). Three types of entities participate to the Bitcoin
ecosystem: users, that spend and receive bitcoins, peers that
propagate transactions in the Bitcoin network and maintain a
local copy of the blockchain, and miners, that establish the
order in which transactions are committed in the blockchain.
Of course at any time, an entity may play any role in the
Bitcoin ecosystem. Speciﬁcally, suppose that Alice wishes to
buy some item from Bob. Alice creates a transaction T , in
which she indicates the price b of that item, a set of outputs
which represents the recipient accounts of the b bitcoins, i.e.,
Bob’s one, and a set of inputs which provides a digest of
transactions {T1, T2, . . . , T} Alice’s account was recipient of
(i.e., these transactions contribute to Alice earnings). The total
number of bitcoins s received by Alice in {T1, T2, . . . , T}
must be at least greater than b. An output from a previous
transaction can be referenced at most once in the input of a
subsequent transaction, otherwise it would mean that the same
bitcoins could be spent several times. Thus, if s > b Alice
may add herself as one of the outputs of her own transaction
to get change. Note that Alice may voluntarily pay a small
transaction fee which will be kept by the miner that contributes
to the commitment of transaction T . Finally, Alice digitally
signs transaction T and submits her transaction T to any peer
of Bitcoin for validation purpose. When peer Carol receives
T for validity check, she scans the transactions recorded in
her local copy of the blockchain. Validity check is achieved
by verifying that none of these transactions {T1, T2, . . . , T}
already appear in the blockchain. Once this is positively
checked, Carol informs Bob that T is valid (Bob can provide
his item to Alice), and disseminates T to the Bitcoin network
so that eventually all the peers will locally be aware of T .
The validation process is not sufﬁcient to guarantee that
Alice is not trying to spend the very same bitcoins to David.
To handle this double spending issue without introducing a
trusted central authority, all the transactions must be publicly
announced, and the order in which they are committed must
be unique. The implementation proposed in Bitcoin consists in
incentivizing participants of the network, the so-called miners,
to spend lot of their CPU to satisfy a given proof-of-work. The
effort to build a proof-of-work is large enough to dissuade
miners from changing a block in the blockchain as it requires
to redo the work for that block and for all the subsequent
ones to ensure the consistency of the blocks. Once the proof-
of-work has been generated, it forms, together with the set of
locally pending transactions, a numbered block that the miner
includes in its local copy of the blockchain, and disseminates
it to all the entities of the Bitcoin network so that each one will
append it to its local copy of the blockchain. Bitcoin miners
are incentivized by receiving a reward which is a function of
the number of transactions recorded in the blocks they have
successfully generated, and the possible transactions fees that
appear in those transactions. Note that those rewards are the
way bitcoins are created.
As previously described, miners are rewarded for generating
blocks, which introduces a competition among them to ﬁnd
the next proof-of-work. This competition may lead to the
generation of concurrent blocks leading to the creation of
branches in the blockchain, and thus jeopardizing the existence
of a unique history of validated transactions. Hopefully, this
inconsistency should be transient. Indeed, Bitcoin relies on the
assumption that eventually, some miner will be able to gener-
ate a proof-of-work quicker than any of the other miners which
will make the branch of the blockchain his block depends on
longer than any of the other concurrent ones. By construction,
Bitcoin declares the longer branch as the legal one. Thus
eventually, each peer will update its own blockchain replica
with that branch and will remove the concurrent branches
together with their transactions. Hence, Bitcoin system will
eventually stabilize in a state where each peer will share a
consistent version of the Blockchain. Anyway, even if Bitcoin
eventually converges to a legal state, stabilization may take
time, i.e., up to several hours [2]. During this period of time, an
attacker may repeatedly perform double-spend attacks either
by using its own CPU resources or by simply taking advantage
of the presence of a fork. PeerCensus [3] proposes to solve this
issue by providing strong consistency guarantees to Bitcoin.
III. PEERCENSUS
PeerCensus [3] proposes to limit the occurrence of both
forks and double-spend attacks by guaranteeing that the order
in which transactions are committed follows the order in
which they have been submitted to the network. This strong
consistency schema is implemented by relying on Byzantine
Fault Tolerant consensus protocols [4] run among a subset E
of miners, namely, all the miners that successfully generated
a block since the genesis of Bitcoin. From a scalability point
of view, the PeerCensus approach highly depends on Bitcoin
popularity. Indeed, the number of blocks in the blockchain
has recently exceeded k = 400, 000 blocks, meaning that if
each block has been generated by a different miner, at least k
miners will be involved in the execution of each forthcoming
consensus, leading to a message complexity in O(k3). Beyond
this aspect, making E membership at the k-th execution of
consensus depend on the decision obtained at the (k − 1)-
th consensus execution leads with high probability to the
permanent pollution of E . By pollution we mean the presence
of more than one third of byzantine miners in E , even if from
a global point of view, Bitcoin network contains less than one
third of Byzantine entities. The following analysis proves our
assertion.
We denote by μ ∈]0, 1[ the proportion of Byzantine miners
in Bitcoin, and by 1 − μ the proportion of correct ones. We
assume that the delay that elapses between two consecutive
blocks generations is constant (which reﬂects the real behavior
of Bitcoin). Let Bk = (h,m) denote the state of the blockchain
at time k, where h (resp. m) represents the number of blocks
generated by a correct miner (resp. by a byzantine miner). We
assume that Nakamoto, the Bitcoin system creator, is honest
and thus we have B0 = (1, 0). Process B = {Bk|k ≥ 0}, with
Bk ∈ ∗× is an homogeneous discrete time Markov chain
that represents the evolution of the blockchain composition
over time. From state Bk = (h,m), two transitions are possi-
ble : either a new block is generated by a correct miner, and the
blockchain goes to state Bk+1 = (h+ 1,m) with probability
1 − μ, or the new block is generated by a byzantine miner
and the blockchain goes to the state Bk+1 = (h,m+ 1) with
probability μ. State Bk = (h,m) of the blockchain at time k is
said polluted if the number m of Byzantine miners belonging
to E is larger than or equal to (k − 1)/3 [5]. Conversely, a
state that is not polluted is said safe. We partition the space
state ∗ × into two sub-spaces S and T corresponding
respectively to the set of safe and polluted states. Blockchain
composition evolution can be seen as a random walk over
∗ × . Given k ≥ 0, h ≥ 1 and m ≥ 0, and for (1, 0) as
initial state, by using the central limit theorem, we get
lim
k−→∞
{Bk ∈ S} =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 if μ > 1/3
1/2 if μ = 1/3
1 if μ < 1/3.
(1)
(a) {T > k} as a function of μ and
the blockchain size k
(b) Asymptotic behavior of {T >
k} as a function of μ
Relation 1, while in accordance with [3], does not allow us
to claim that all the executions that lead to state Bk are
safe, i.e., ∀0 ≥ k′ ≥ k,Bk′ ∈ S . This argument is of
prime importance, as once E is polluted, the adversary will
be able to impose its decision at each forthcoming consensus,
either on the transactions to be committed or on the blocks
to be included in the blockchain. Let us now derive the
probability of k consecutive safe executions of consensus.
Let T be the time spend in states of S before reaching for
the ﬁrst time a state of P . Formally, the random variable
T is deﬁned by T = min{k ≥ 0|Bk ∈ P}, and we have
{T > k} = {B0 ∈ S, B1 ∈ S, . . . , Bk ∈ S}. Theorem 1
gives the law of the ﬁrst instant of pollution of the blockchain,
as well as its asymptotic behavior.
Theorem 1. Given 0 < μ < 1, for all k ≥ 0, we have
{T > k} = 1
1− μ
k+1∑
h=2k/3+1
(
k + 1
h
)
(1− μ)hμk+1−h
− 3μ
1− μ
k∑
h=2k/3+1
(
k
h
)
(1− μ)hμk−h.
Let (μ) = lim
k−→∞
{T > k}. We have (μ) = 0 if μ > 1/3
and (μ) = 1− 2μ/(1− μ) otherwise.
We observe in Figure 1(a) the fast convergence of T to its
limit (μ), while Figure 1(b) shows that when 0 < μ ≤ 1/3,
the probability to have a series of safe consensus executions
is strictly less than 1. For exemple, for μ = 1/4 < 1/3, we
have (μ) = 1/3 meaning that among all the trajectories of k
consensus executions, only 1/3 of them are safe. This result
clearly shows the limitations of the PeerCensus approach to
solve Bitcoin weaknesses.
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